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Potential for Army Integration
of Autonomous Systems by
Warfighting Function
Maj. Thomas Ryan, U.S. Army
Vikram Mittal, PhD

S

trategists analyze military history to understand
the evolution of war. However, they often turn to
science fiction to predict the future of war. Star
Wars: Episode 1–The Phantom Menace captures a standard
vision of the future of ground combat—autonomous robots marching into war with the guidance of their human
overlords. This view follows fairly simple logic: Combat is
dangerous, so why not use technology to reduce the risk
to humans? Meanwhile, other movies are equally adept
at capturing the opposing view of the use of autonomous
systems in combat. Take The Matrix and Terminator movies as examples. These movies preach a cautionary tale
that autonomous systems can create an unparalleled capacity to destroy an adversary; however, left unchecked,
the overuse of autonomy can destroy humanity.
These beliefs are captured in the Army’s official
stance toward the use of autonomous systems, which
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clarifies that autonomous systems are intended to
support the warfighter, not replace them.1 As such,
the vision of dropping a large number of robotic
combatants onto a battlefield, as seen in the Star Wars
movies, is science fiction. However, the use of autonomous systems moving soldiers into combat is readily
becoming science reality.
It is widely known that the Army has steadily been
investing in the development of autonomous systems.
As shown conceptually in figure 1 (on page 124),
which plots the combat power of the Army against
the total end strength, the use of autonomous systems
provides a strategic advantage. Autonomous systems
provide a combat multiplication factor that allows the
Army to increase its combat power while potentially
reducing troop numbers. Currently, the investments
in autonomy are limited by financial constraints as
well as the state of technology. Though these limited
investments still result in a significant increase in the
combat multiplication factor, these increases are small
compared to what is possible if autonomous systems
are integrated to their maximum capacity.

Marines with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment test new equipment
such as the unmanned Multi-Utility Tactical Transport (MUTT) vehicle 8 July 2016 in a simulated combat environment at Marine Corps
Base at Camp Pendleton, California. The MUTT is designed as a force
multiplier to enhance expeditionary power, enabling marines to cover
larger areas and providing superior firepower with the smallest tactical
footprint possible. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Julien Rodarte, U.S. Marines)
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This article sets out to explain the maximum extent
that the Army can integrate autonomous systems into its
operations given the inherent limitations of the technology. These limitations determine the appropriateness of
using autonomous systems to perform each of the broad
range of Army tasks that are captured through the warfighter functions. While certain tasks will remain human
driven, other tasks can be fully automated, although most
tasks will fall somewhere between. In turn, this analysis
provides insights and guidance into the resource allocation
and implementation of autonomous systems.

Warfighting Functions
To remain competitive in a multi-domain operational
environment, the question is not “should we” but “where
do we” become more autonomous? The Army is made up
of over a million different soldiers comprising over 450
different military occupational specialties, ranging from
infantrymen to plumbers to veterinarians. Some of these
jobs could greatly benefit from the addition of autonomy
while others would not. The broad range of tasks associated with these different duty positions are typically
captured in the six warfighting functions.

A warfighting function is a group of tasks and
systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions.2 The six warfighting
functions of the U.S. Army are
mission command: the integration of the other five
warfighting functions to enable a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control;
movement and maneuver: the achieving of a
position of relative advantage over the enemy and
other threats to the employment of force;
intelligence: the gathering and processing of information to develop an understanding of the enemy,
terrain, and civil considerations;
fires: the use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting
process;
sustainment: the providing of support and services to
ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach,
and prolong endurance; and
protection: the preserving of the force so that a
commander may apply maximum combat power
to accomplish a mission.3

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Providing logistics support, for
example, comprises providing
maintenance, transportation,
supply, field services, operational
contract, distribution, and general engineer support.
Limited
Altogether, 205 different
Low
High
lower-level subfunctions conTroop end strength
stitute the full scope of Army
(Figure by authors)
missions.4 These lower-level
functions are fairly specific and
Figure 1. Trade-Off between the Overall Combat
provide enough granularity for
Power and Troop End Strength at Varying Levels of
analysis of the appropriateness
Integration of Autonomous Systems
of autonomy for that function.
For example, little autonomy
can be applied toward providing religious support.
4. Humans will be preferred over autonomous sysHowever, a high level of autonomy can be applied totems for certain tasks that require a human-to-huward employing communications security. The results
man connection, such as key leader engagements
are then aggregated up for each top-level subfunction
and chaplain support.
and warfighting function.
5. The usage of autonomous systems cannot result in a
decrease in the Army’s ability to perform its missions.
Rules for Autonomy
6. Human judgment, or “human-in-the-loop,” will be reA review of different federal policies and strategies
quired for any activities that involve killing a human.
provided a set of rules related to the implementation of
The United States has already laid the groundwork
autonomous systems in ground combat. The appropriatefor the sixth rule with Department of Defense Directive
ness of applying autonomy to each lower-level subfunction 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, which limits
is subject to the following six rules:
the development of autonomous weapons that do not
1. Autonomous systems should be used over huinclude humans in the kill chain.5 On a global level,
mans in potentially dangerous situations, subject
similar initiatives are underway, since autonomous
to the other rules.
killing systems would set off a technical arms race where
2. Autonomous systems will be preferred over
countries would rapidly develop more advanced artificial
humans for computationally intensive tasks, thus
intelligence with faster kill chains.6
allowing an overall reduction in the likelihood
of human mental errors. Similarly, autonomous
Levels of Autonomy
systems should be used for severely mundane tasks
While autonomous systems are often envisioned as
that require mental endurance.
Terminator-style robots, in reality, autonomous sys3. Military command positions, whether they be
tems can range from automated payroll software to
American, allied, or adversary, will remain human.
remote-controlled drones to cruise control on vehicles.
September-October 2019
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Table. Different Levels of Autonomy
Autonomy Level

Description

0

No autonomy, humans only

1

Automated system aids humans

2

Human manages automated system

3

Automated system only
(Table by authors)

Potential autonomy level

With a broad range of levels of
autonomy, it is useful to categorize autonomy into fixed ranges.
The table displays four different
levels of autonomy that will be
used for this analysis.
A value of 0 indicates that
no automation is currently
being used; an example of an
autonomy level of 0 would be
driving a traditional car. A value
of 1 indicates that a human
uses an automated system to
increase their ability to complete the task, such as a cruise
control system in the car. A
value of 2 indicates that the human
and automated system are working together to complete the task,
though the human is primarily providing the system with inputs, such
as a “self-driving” car with a backup
human or remote operator. A value
of 3 indicates that the human is taken out of the loop, and the system is
performing the task on its own, such
as a fully autonomous car that can
navigate itself through traffic from
one waypoint to another.
Each lower-level subfunction
of the warfighting function was
analyzed to determine the maximum
level of autonomy subject to the rules
identified in the previous section.

0–1
1–2
2–3

• Intelligence support to ground operations
• Intelligence support to targeting
• Support to situational understanding
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)

Figure 2. Autonomy Levels for the Intelligence
Warfighting Function

Intelligence Warfighting Function
The intelligence warfighting function is the most
pervasive and encompassing task in the military
because its results drive all operations.7 As shown in
figure 2, the intelligence warfighting function is made
up of four subfunctions with the potential to use a
significant amount of autonomy.
Currently, autonomous systems are supporting
human analysts in virtually all of the subfunctions,
since they allow the analysts to more readily collect and
process data. Unmanned aerial vehicles have been used
for intelligence gathering for decades. Additionally,
MILITARY REVIEW
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autonomous software codes are used for cyberspace
monitoring to gather intelligence. There are also
systems under development, such as the U.S. Special
Operations Command’s hyper-enabled operator, that
will use a higher level of autonomy to automate the full
intelligence process from collection to analysis.
The use of autonomous systems for these warfighting functions are driven by rules 1 and 2. Intelligence
gathering is a dangerous activity, often requiring humans to travel behind enemy lines to collect data about
the enemy and terrain. Much of this data can be collected by autonomous systems as they have the capacity
to collect and process a large amount of raw data.
125

Despite these benefits, certain subfunctions are limited in the amount of possible autonomy. Intelligence
support to ground operations will still require a human-in-the-loop to understand the human dimension
associated with ground operations. Additionally, targeting requires a human-in-the-loop to allow for human
judgment in the data analysis. However, intelligence
support to situational understanding, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance can both achieve a
fairly high degree of autonomy.

Movement and Maneuver
Warfighting Function
The movement and maneuver warfighting function
encompasses those functions involved in moving and
employing direct force against enemy forces.8 The subtasks include maneuver operations, tactical movements,
direct fires, occupying areas, performing reconnaissance, and other related tasks. Figure 3 (on page 127)
displays the possible levels of autonomy for the movement and maneuver warfighting function.

Currently, there is a large push to integrate autonomy into this warfighting function, especially for the
tactical movement and reconnaissance subfunctions.
For example, the Squad Multipurpose Equipment
Transport is a robotic vehicle that follows a dismounted squad, enhancing their movement by carrying
much of their equipment. Another important effort
is the Future Vertical Lift Aircraft, which will include
autonomous flight capabilities, allowing units not to
be constrained to the human-limits of flight crews.9
Several other programs, such as the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s Squad X Experimentation
Program, are looking at further enhancing the use of
autonomous systems, especially for reconnaissance.
Several projects also involve integrating autonomy into tactical maneuver and direct fire operations.

A QinetiQ Talon 5 robot moves a drone 7 May 2019 during a Raven’s
Challenge exercise at Winter Park, Colorado. Raven’s Challenge is an
annual event that provides interoperability training in a realistic, domestic, tactical environment to explosive ordnance disposal personnel and public safety bomb squads of both military and government
agencies. (Photo by Sgt. Zakia Gray, U.S. Army)
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Potential autonomy level

Potential autonomy level

The level of autonomy is set for
the
movement and maneuver warf• Mobility operations
ighting function based on rule 6, and a
• Tactical maneuver
high level of autonomy is possible for
0–1
two of the subfunctions—performing
• Direct fires
reconnaissance and employing obscu• Force projection and deployment
rants—because they do not require
the use of lethal force. A lower level
of autonomy can be integrated into
three of the other subfunctions—tac• Tactical troop movements
tical troop movements, occupying an
1–2 • Occupation of an area
area, and countermobility operations.
• Countermobility operations
These subfunctions can involve the
use of force, so human involvement
is required though it can be primarily
oversight. The other four subfunc• Reconnaissance
tions—mobility operations, tactical
2–3
• Obscurant employment
maneuver, direct fires, and force
projection—involve the direct use of
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
force, as such, autonomy can be used
in only a very limited capacity.
Figure 3. Autonomy Levels for the Movement
The integration of autonomous
and Maneuver Warfighting Function
systems is fairly limited by the requirement of having a human in the
kill chain. As such, autonomous systems are
more useful for defensive operations than
0–1 • Fire support
offensive operations. Offensive operations
involve closing in on and killing the enemy,
which inherently requires a human in the
• Integration of files
loop. However, security and defensive oper1–2
ations tend to involve deterring the enemy,
• Integration of air-ground operations
which can be done without lethal force, hence
allowing autonomy.

2–3

• Air and missile defense

Fires Warfighting Function

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-03,
The Army Universal Task List, gives the four
top-level subfunctions for the fires warfighting
Figure 4. Autonomy Levels for the Fires
functions: integrate fires, provide fire support,
Warfighting Function
integrate air-ground operations, and employ
air and missile defense.10 Each subtask and the
However, these projects are fairly constrained, such
associated autonomy levels are displayed in figure 4.
as the Advanced Targeting and Lethality Automated
The current usage of autonomy in the fires warSystem Program, which is simply a remote-operated
fighting function is limited to detecting threats and
gun on a mobile platform that provides additional
supporting the computations required for providstandoff from a target; however, it still requires a
ing direct fire support. However, humans are still
designated operator.
required to aim and fire weapons. Most artillery
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
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Protection Warfighting Function
The protection warfighting function is comprised
of fifteen top-level subfunctions ranging from lawand-order operations to explosive ordnance disposal
to air-missile defense.11 These subfunctions are categorized by their possible levels of autonomy in figure 5.
The protection warfighting function is primarily
defensive in nature. As previously discussed, autonomy
can be better applied to defensive operations rather than
offensive. However, the use of autonomy for this warfighting function is set by rule 4, since some of its functions require substantial human-to-human interaction,
including police operations, resettlement operations,
and health protection. Other subfunctions still require
128

Potential autonomy level

Potential autonomy level

systems, such as the M109
Paladin, include comput• Police operations
er software to help auto0–1 • Resettlement operations
mate the targeting process.
• Force health protection
Additionally, these systems
are being upgraded with
advanced automated technol• Personnel recovery
ogy to allow for better threat
• Safety techniques
detection, faster targeting, and
1–2
automated aiming.
• Antiterrorism measures
Similar to the movement
• Detention operations
and maneuver warfighting
function, rule 6 sets which subfunctions in the fires warfighting
• Air and missile defense
function can use autonomy.
• Explosive ordnance disposal
Fire support involves the direct
• Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations
employment of force against an
enemy, so although autonomy
2–3 • Physical security
can support the soldier, its usage
• Operational area security
is limited. The integration of
• Operations security
fires and air-ground operations
are both supporting subtasks.
• Survivability operations
Therefore, a certain amount of
(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)
autonomy is applicable, although humans are still required
Figure 5. Autonomy Levels for the Protection
for prioritization of fires. AirWarfighting Function
missile defense is a defensive
operation and does not require
killing humans. Additionally, it
0–1
is a computationally intensive
process that requires very fast action. As such, this subfunction is ripe for the use of autonomous systems.

1–2

• Health service support
• Personnel support

2–3

• Logistics support
(Figure by authors)

Figure 6. Autonomy Levels for the
Sustainment Warfighting Function
some human-to-human interaction, such that a human
must be kept in the loop. These subfunctions include
personnel operations, safety, antiterrorism measures,
September-October 2019
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0–1

•
•
•
•
•

Operations process
Command post operations
Execution of command programs
Team development
Soldier-leader engagement

1–2

•
•
•
•

Public affair operations
Military deception
Information support operations
Civil affairs operations

2–3

•
•
•
•
•
•

Knowledge and information management
Control of tactical airspace
Integration of space operations
Cyberelectromagnetic activities
Network installation and maintenance
Synchronize information

to have faster response times than humans.
Second, many of the tasks follow doctrinal
steps, which require minimal human judgment and are ripe for autonomy. Third, many
of these tasks involve placing humans in
compromising positions.
Take survivability operations for example. The construction of a fortified battle position requires digging fighting positions and
placing and filling Hesco baskets (used to
construct large barriers). A remote-operated
front loader, often used for commercial applications, would allow a soldier to perform
these tasks from a protected location. With
further integration efforts, one could imagine drawing a battle position on a map, and a
team of autonomous systems surveying the
area, performing the threat assessment, designing an optimal battle position, and constructing it prior to humans arriving on-site.
Upon completion of the fortified position,
autonomous systems could help detect and
deter encroachment into the area.

(Figure by authors; subfunctions in blue italics indicate areas currently using autonomy)

Figure 7. Autonomy Levels for the Mission
Command Warfighting Function
and detention operations. However, the bulk of the tasks
associated with the protection of warfighting functions
can incorporate a large amount of autonomy.
Despite the high potential, the current usage of autonomous systems in the protection warfighting function
is somewhat limited. Air-missile defense systems use
autonomous systems to track and destroy incoming fires.
Additionally, explosive ordnance disposal personnel use
remote-controlled autonomous systems such as TALON
and PackBot robots to provide standoff from explosives.
The protection warfighting function has numerous
opportunities for the use of advanced autonomy in
future operations. These opportunities are for a number
of reasons. First, protection is inherently responsive in
nature, such that an action is performed following a
specific input. These actions normally require a fast response time, and autonomous systems have the potential
MILITARY REVIEW
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Sustainment
Warfighting Function

The sustainment warfighting function is
broken down into three high-level tasks: logistics, personnel, and health service support.12
Figure 6 (on page 128) displays how much
autonomy can be applied to each of these subfunctions.
Currently, autonomous systems are used sparingly for
the sustainment warfighting function. Automating the
tasks that fall under logistics would require significant updates to the bulk of military vehicles and equipment. This
process is expensive, resources are limited, and current
sustainment capabilities are sufficient. However, with the
increased threat of improvised explosive devices and the
dangers associated with convoy operations, autonomous
convoys, which leverage self-driving technology, would
reduce troop numbers while also saving lives.
Similar to the protection warfighting function,
rule 4 sets the limits on the maximum autonomy
levels for each subfunction. Both health service
support and personnel require a certain amount
of human-to-human interaction; however, certain
portions of these subfunctions can be automated.
129

For example, financial management support, which
falls under personnel support, can benefit from
autonomous software that handle payroll. However,
chaplain support, which also falls under personnel
support, will still require a chaplain.
Logistics can achieve a significantly higher degree of autonomy. Many of the tasks included under
logistics support follow set procedures; for example,
performing preventive maintenance checks and
services on a vehicle requires going down a checklist
and making sure that the vehicle functions properly.
When processes follow very set procedures, they are
ripe for autonomy.
Additionally, there are numerous strategic benefits
from incorporating autonomy into the sustainment
warfighting function. The displacement of humans by
autonomous systems would expand operational reach.
Enemies have traditionally targeted supply lines as easy
targets, which then require additional security, drawing
away soldiers from more critical missions. Autonomous
systems would require less security and can assume
more risk, allowing them to move faster and through
areas that are not safe for humans.
130

A marine with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment looks down at an
autonomous “dragon fire” system 13 July 2016 at Marine Corps Base
Camp Pendleton, California. The system, meant to enhance observation of an enemy before marines engage them, was built by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. It is durable, invertible with front
and rear cameras, and both day and night capable. (Photo by Lance
Cpl. Julien Rodarte, U.S. Marines)

Mission Command
Warfighting Function
As the name implies, the mission command warfighting function involves providing command guidance
and leadership to integrate the other five warfighter
functions to perform unified land operations. The
mission command warfighting function can be broken
down into fifteen subtasks, which are categorized by
possible autonomy levels in figure 7 (on page 129).
Rules 3 and 4 set the maximum limits for the use
of autonomy in this warfighting function. Leadership
and command guidance must be provided by humans, so autonomy is limited for the operations
process, command-post operations, and execution
September-October 2019
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Potential for integration of
autonomous systems

of command programs.
High
Additionally, human-to-huIntelligence
man interactions are required
Protection
for team development and
soldier-leader engagements.
A slightly higher degree of
Sustainment
autonomy can be applied to
tasks that are not directly tied
Mission
to leadership positions. These
command
tasks include public affair operations, military deception, information support operations,
Fires
and civil affairs operations.
Movement and
However, the usage of autonmaneuver
omy will only play a supportLimited
ing role due to the necessary
Low
High
human-to-human interactions
Current resource allocation to
associated with these tasks.
integration
of autonomous systems
Several of the subfunctions
(Figure by authors)
are tied to the virtual domain,
and the application of autoFigure 8. Current Resource Allocation toward the
mation would greatly enhance
Integration of Autonomous Systems Plotted against
these subfunctions. These include knowledge management,
the Overall Potential for Integration
control of tactical airspace,
integration of space operations,
cyberelectromagnetic activities, and network and
functions, which have a significant potential for the
synchronizing information.
overall integration of autonomous systems.
Due to the requirement of humans being in leadThe current alignment of resources to potential for
ership positions, little effort has been put into developautomation is not optimized. This is due to equipment
ing autonomous systems to support this warfighting
and technology development for the movement and
function. However, there is a significant opportunity
maneuver, fires, and intelligence warfighting functions
for certain subfunctions that are not related to being in
receiving priority over the other three warfighting
leadership positions.
functions. For example, though the Army Equipment
Modernization Strategy includes investments for all
Current Resource Allocation
warfighting functions, priority is given to these three
toward Autonomy
warfighting functions, with more risk being assumed
Figure 8 plots the current resource allocation tofor the other three warfighting functions. Likewise,
ward autonomous systems against the overall potenmost of the Army science and technology near-term,
tial for integration. The plot shows that a significant
mid-term, and long-term investments are related to
amount of resources are allocated for the intelligence,
these warfighting functions.13
movement and maneuver, and fires warfighting
While the investments in the fires and movement
functions. However, both the movement and maneuand maneuver warfighting functions offer new caver and the fires warfighting functions are limited
pabilities to the soldier, a much larger benefit can be
into how much total autonomy can be applied to it.
made from applying autonomy to the sustainment and
Meanwhile, much fewer resources have been allocatprotection warfighting functions. Since these warfighted for the protection and sustainment warfighting
ing functions can achieve a much higher amount of
MILITARY REVIEW
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integration of autonomous systems, the combat multiplication factor is higher. More simply stated, entire
companies of protection and sustainment personnel
can be replaced with autonomous systems supported
by a few personnel for leadership and quality assurance.
These new autonomous systems will potentially be
faster, more efficient, and safer.
Note that though man-unmanned pairings and
integrating robots into the squad is in the distant
future, commercial technology is currently available to
support the sustainment and protection warfighting
function. Self-driving vehicles that can convoy, robotic
maintenance systems, package delivery systems by
drones, autonomous network monitoring, and GPSguided farm equipment are all technology that could
have military applications.

Reduction in Numbers and Benefits
The integration of autonomy into the warfighting functions creates opportunities for a reduction
in troop count, assuming that the Army wishes to
maintain a given level of combat power. Typically, an
autonomy level of 1 will result in a new capability that
will allow the Army to complete the task more expediently. An autonomy level of 2 will not only result

in a new capability but also the ability to reduce the
number of soldiers. This reduction is typically at an individual level, such that individuals in a squad could be
replaced with an autonomous system. Meanwhile, an
autonomy level of 3 will result in replacing an entire
unit with an autonomous system, only leaving a few
humans for quality assurance.
The sustainment and protection warfighting
functions both have a significant number of tasks that
can be automated. Additionally, in the Global War
on Terrorism, approximately 70 percent of deployed
soldiers were tied to these two warfighting functions.
As such, the application of autonomy toward these
warfighting functions would allow for a significant
reduction in boots on the ground.
The largest benefit of replacing humans with
autonomous systems is safety. Using autonomous systems in dirty, dangerous, and dull situations reduces
the risk to soldiers. However, there are substantial
cost savings as well. For monetary reasons, the U.S.
government has strived to reduce troop numbers in
the past while maintaining the overall strength of the
force. The most cost-effective, long-term method is
through incorporating autonomous systems. Though
these systems carry an initial high development cost,

An autonomously activated device emits vapor to obscure the rear of
a utility task vehicle 26 April 2019 during the Robotic Complex Breach
Concept, a military event focused on autonomous technologies at Yakima Training Center, Washington. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Nathaniel
Hamilton, U.S. Marines)

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

the reduction in troop numbers across the Army
would offset these costs. Soldiers carry a large life
cycle cost since they must be trained, paid, billeted,
and equipped while they are in the service; additionally, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides
health care after they leave the military.
Alternatively, the Army may decide to keep its
end state. In that case, the use of autonomous systems
could afford a redistribution of personnel by military
occupational specialty. The current heuristic is that
for every individual combat soldier, there are approximately two to three support soldiers. Increased
investment in autonomy for the sustainment warfighting function has the ability to significantly reduce
this ratio. With a constant end state, this could result
in an increase in combat soldiers.

Conclusion
Some may perceive the future of autonomous
systems in the Army as formations of armed robots
marching into combat; however, this situation is
unlikely due to the constraints placed on autonomous systems in combat. Moreover, it is shortsighted

because it only addresses a small portion of the tasks
that the Army is required to perform.
This study set out to determine what the maximum integration of autonomous systems into the
Army would look like. In particular, it looked at each
of the warfighting functions and supporting subfunctions to determine the applicability of using autonomy to support that function. In some instances, an
autonomous system could perform the function with
little human oversight, while in other instances, only
humans can perform the function.
The results found that while autonomy could
benefit all the warfighting functions, the intelligence,
protection, and sustainment warfighting functions
could benefit the most. This finding does not align
with the current Army investments into autonomous systems, which are more focused on the movement and maneuver, intelligence, and fires warfighting functions. Significant benefits can be realized
through the application of autonomous systems to
the protection and sustainment warfighting functions, resulting in an increase in combat power while
reducing troop numbers.
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